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Introduction
The rise and fall of a  state are events that produce specific legal consequences. These 
effects, especially in the field of succession, are regulated – to a greater or lesser extent 
– by international law1. An equally important issue is to determine whether the very 
rise and fall of the state is regulated by international law. International law deals with 
the state from outside, as an existing phenomenon. This statement remains valid as far 
as the creation of the state is concerned. As for the fall of the state, international law 
has never really been a mere witness of this event. If in earlier times, annexation was 
one of the reasons for the state’s collapse (if not the main reason), it was international 
law that determined the conditions of its legality. To a much greater extent, the fall of 
the state is regulated by modern international law. This is connected not only with the 
prohibition on the use of force and the resulting prohibition on annexation, but also 
with the right of nations to self-determination. Annexation is nowadays an illegal act 
and therefore does not cause the state to fall, not only because it is a consequence of the 
use of force, but also because it is incompatible with the right of peoples and nations to 
self-determination. A nation can not be deprived of its own state against its will. 
The right of nations to self-determination is in this respect complementary to the 
basic law of the state – the right to exist. According to contemporary international law, 
the loss of statehood (and thus the loss of subjectivity of international law) can only 
take place on a voluntary basis. However, there are also reasons for the fall of a state, 
for which international law was and still is really only a witness (e.g. when the existing 
state is divided into several parts: In any case, it can be initially established that at least 
some cases of state collapse are regulated by international law. The situation is different 
1 Vid. R.  Kwiecień, Status prawny i  rola państw w  społeczności międzynarodowej a  podmiotowe 
granice prawa międzynarodowego, in: Państwo i  terytorium w  prawie międzynarodowym, eds. 
J. Menkes, E. Cała-Wacinkiewicz, Warszaw 2015, p. 85. 
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when it comes to the creation of states. Here, international law is always only a witness 
registering the fact of its creation. For international law is indifferent with regard to 
the way in which the state was created. The rise of the state in the wake of a civil war 
is no less “legal” than the rise of states as a result of the independence granted by the 
metropolis. Those two examples of how the state was founded can and should be dis-
tinguished, but only from the point of view of the genesis of a given state, which may 
consist of various elements which are real (e.g. civil war) as well as legal (metropolitan 
legal acts, international agreements or the resolutions of relevant UN bodies) – in the 
light of international law there is no significance in the creation of a state. The creation 
of a state is an act independent of its origin. The state does not have to prove its genesis. 
Undoubtedly, these or other elements of the genesis of the state may facilitate or hinder 
the international situation of the state in the initial period of its existence, may, in par-
ticular, be important for its the recognition by other states2. In the course of the decolo-
nization process that followed the Second World War, many new countries emerged, 
especially in Asia and Africa. These countries were created during the period when the 
right to self-determination became a rule of international law. Therefore, it can be said 
that these states arose as a result of the peoples of these countries (i.e. former colonial 
areas) realizing their right to self-determination. Due to the importance of the right to 
self-determination for the genesis of the state in our modern times, it requires more de-
tailed discussion. On the other hand, the right to self-determination also plays a specific 
role in the event of a state failure. 
The Rise and Fall of the State and International Law
According to C. Berezowski, there are certain reasons for the creation of a state, some of 
which are connected with the creation of a state in a direct way, and therefore they can be 
called causes that are closer to the creation of the state3. The entirety of these causes de-
termines the formation of the state, constituting its genesis4. The beginning of the origin 
of the state is the first proximate cause, and thus certain events t can be legally assessed as 
2 Vid. E. Dynia, Uzananie państwa w prawie międzynarodowym, Rzeszów, 2017, p. 304.
3 Vid. C. Berezowski, Powstanie państwa polskiego w świetle prawa międzynarodowego, Warszawa 
1934, p. 31; J. Crawford, The creation of states in international law, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
2006; M. Shaw, International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003; T. Grant, The 
Recognition of States: Law and Practice in Debate and Evolution, Greenwood Publishing Group, 
Westport 1999; J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, Oxford University Press, 
2nd ed. Oxford 2006; A. Klafkowski, Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne, Warszawa 1971, p. 112. 
4 C. Schreuer, The waning of the sovereign State: Towards a new paradigm for international law?, in: 
“European Journal of International Law”, 1993, p. 447; Yearbook of the International Law Com-
mission , 1975/II, p. 93.
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being in direct relation with the state’s establishment5. According to C. Berezowski, the 
beginning of the genesis of the state takes place when the legal order existing in a given 
area makes concessions for emancipation, i.e. when it recognizes the possibility of its 
manifestations. In the event of an armed uprising, such a concession is the state’s recog-
nition of insurgents. An example of gaining independence following armed struggle is 
the creation of Algeria on July 1 1962. In 1954, the National Liberation Front was cre-
ated, and in 1958 – the Provisional Government; on March 19 1962, in Evian, the French 
government concluded with the Provisional Government of Republic Algerian a  so-
called a general arrangement in which steps were planned which would lead to Algeria’s 
independence. The overwhelming majority of states created as a result of decolonization 
gained independence through it being granted by the metropole. In these cases, the gen-
esis of individual states consists of the legal acts of the metropolis. A special procedure 
was applicable to fiduciary areas. Here the decisive role was played by the resolutions of 
the UN General Assembly on the expiry of relevant trust agreements. C. Berezowski 
expresses the view that in the case of fiduciary areas, the beginning of a new state is the 
conclusion of a trust deed. 
The legal acts of the metropole, agreements between the metropole and the organs 
of the national liberation movement, and the resolutions of the UN General Assembly 
concerning specific areas, are individualized acts as elements of the genesis of a specific 
state. In addition, the right to self-determination has a significant impact on the origin 
of the states that arise from the decolonization process. The right to self-determination 
understood as the right of colonial peoples to independence (part II) has the character 
of a general norm requiring colonial powers to carry out decolonization. If a colonial 
people make a claim for independence, grounds for this are found in international law 
and the metropole is obliged to take appropriate steps to satisfy this claim. In other 
words, the right to self-determination as a general norm will determine, as soon as the 
colonial people invoke it, the origin of the state. The creation of the state, however, is an 
act independent of its origin. Regardless of whether the home state cooperates in the 
process of the formation of a new state (i.e. according to the popular term “grants in-
dependence”) or actively combats this process, the act of forming a state is of a primary 
nature. In the event of independence by the colonies, the metropole most often gradually 
passed individual competencies to local authorities. However, the original character of 
the act of establishing a state denies that the new state takes power away from another 
country. The power of the new state is always its primary power, which it derives from its 
own (and not given) sovereignty. The state always arises from its own power, regardless of 
its origin. The state is not, therefore, established on the basis of a legal act of the metrop-
olis granting independence on the basis of an international treaty or a resolution of the 
5 L.  Antonowicz, Powstanie i  upadek państw jako podmiotów prawa Międzynarodowego, in: 
“Sprawy Międzynarodowe”, 1968, no. 2, p. 71.
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General Assembly of the United Nations, as these are only elements of its genesis. Since 
the state is always created by its own power, the manner in which the state is founded 
cannot be subject to legal assessment. In the literature, the establishment of a state is 
usually referred to as a historical fact, poetic, sociological or extralegal. While circum-
stances connected with the creation of a state may be available for legal assessment, the 
examination of the compatibility of the act of establishing a state with international law 
is ruled out. From the point of view of international law, it is a matter of indifference 
how the state was created. International law does not accept earlier matters in relation to 
obtaining the characteristics of statehood and, consequently, remains indifferent to the ways 
that a  certain community can use to form the state6. The legal status of a well-organized 
community is not affected by either the moral defects of the genesis or the violation of 
the law which could have been accompanied by its establishment. International law is 
limited to confirming the establishment of a state, referring to the features of statehood. 
While – as claimed by J. Symonides – the process and causes leading to the emergence 
of the state are of secondary significance, it is of prime importance to determine the cri-
teria and the origin of the state, because with this date certain legal effects are connected, 
as the state it becomes the subject of rights and obligations7. 
The existence of a state as a sovereign territorial organization determinines its effec-
tiveness8. According to H. Kelsen, the moment of the establishment of the state is de-
termined by positive international law in accordance with the principle of efficiency9. 
J. Symonides defines the principle of effectiveness as the principle according to which 
the actual (effective) existence or non-existence of the actual situations prescribed by 
international law causes ipso facto legal effects, or is a  necessary condition for their 
emergence. Referring to the earlier considerations, it can be concluded that unless there 
is a legal norm regulating the way the state was established, the principle of effectiveness 
determines its creation. The principle of effectiveness does not regulate the way the state 
is founded, but – and this is its significance – allows the answers to two important ques-
tions to be ascertained: whether the state was founded at all and when it arose. As far as 
the first issue is concerned, in accordance with the principle of effectiveness, a specific 
factual situation must be not only real: “The condition of the effectiveness of the actual 
6 T. Grant, op. cit.; C. Drew, The Meaning of Self-determination: The Stealing of the Sahara Redux?, 
Karin Arts & Pedro Pinto Leite, International law and the question of Western Sahara (Leiden, 
IPJET, 2007), p. 87.  
7 J.  Symonides, Terytorium państwowe w  świetle zasady efektywności, Toruń 1971, pp. 178–179; 
W.  Multan, J.  Symonides: Powstanie Ludowej Republiki Bengalii  – niektóre aspekty 
prawnomiędzynarodowe, in: “Sprawy Międzynarodowe” 1972, nr 6, pp. 50–51.
8 J. Sondel, ‘Ius postliminii’, jako podstawa uznania ciągłości I i II oraz II i III Rzeczypospolitej, [w:] 
Na szlakach Niepodległej. Polska myśl polityczna i prawna w latach 1918–1939, ed. M. Marszał, 
M. Sadowski, Wrocław 2009, p. 22.
9 H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law, New York 1959, s. 258.  
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situation is to have a firm and stable character. The uncertain and unstable situation usu-
ally does not have legal consequences.” This condition of stability and sustainability plays 
an important role in the formation of the state. The requirement of stability and durabil-
ity, stemming from the rule of principle, makes it possible to state which territorial com-
munities that regard themselves as states.  Therefore, Mandżukuo (1932–1945), Slovakia 
(1939–1945) and Croatia (1941–1945) were not states operating under international law. 
Rhodesia, whose authorities proclaimed independence from British law in 1965, was not 
a state, but not because of its genesis and its system, which did not correspond to the will 
of the majority of the population, but because the existing situation there did not meet 
the requirement durability and stability10. 
The Right to Self-Determination and the Rise and Fall of the State
The principle of self-determination means not only the right to create one’s own state11. Its 
reach also includes nations that already have their own countries. In this case, the subject 
of the right to self-determination is a nation identified with the entire population of an 
already existing state. The right to self-determination here means the right of every na-
tion to choose the form of government and the political and social system that suits it12. 
The principle of self-determination is here closely related to the principle of sovereignty 
and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Since every na-
tion has the right to determine, without foreign interference, the system of its state, it is 
even more entitled to maintain this state. No nation, therefore, can be deprived of its own 
state against its will13. In this context, the principle of self-determination is closely related 
to the prohibition of the use of force and the threat of its use. It also complements the 
10 G. Kreijen. ÔThe Transformation of Sovereignty and African Independence: No Shortcuts to State-
hoodÕ, in: State Sovereignty and International Governance, ed. G. Kreijen, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2002, p. 45.
11 C. Drew. The Meaning of Self-determination: The Stealing of the Sahara Redux?, in: Karin Arts 
& Pedro Pinto Leite, International law and the question of Western Sahara (Leiden, IP-
JET, 2007), p. 87. “Wszystkie narody mają prawo do samostanowienia. Z mocy tego prawa 
swobodnie określają one swój status polityczny i  swobodnie zapewniają swój rozwój gospo-
darczy, społeczny i kulturalny”. Art. 1 ust. 1 Międzynarodowego Paktu Praw Obywatelskich 
i Politycznych (Dz.U. z 1977 r. Nr 38, poz. 167, zał.). 
12 F. Przetacznik, The Basic Collective Human Right to Self-Determination of Peoples and Nation as 
a Prerequisite for Peace: its Philosophical Background and Practical Application, in: “Revue de Droit 
International. De Sciences diplomatiques et politiques. The International Law Review” 1/1992, 
p. 25. 
13 Vid. J. Kolasa, Odzyskanie przez Polskę niepodległości w 1918 r. w świetle prawa międzynarodowego, 
in: “Przegląd Sejmowy” 5/2008, p. 29; Vid. S. Hubert, Odbudowa państwa polskiego jako prob-
lemat prawa narodów, Lwów 1934; idem, Rozbiory i  odrodzenie Rzeczypospolitej. Zagadnienie 
prawa międzynarodowego, Lwów 1937; J. Sondel, op. cit., p. 22. 
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fundamental right of the state to exist. The right to self-determination also implies that 
every nation can renounce its own statehood, either by establishing with a new nation or 
nations a new state (the unification of states) or by joining another state (incorporation). 
If, however, there are circumstances that raise doubts as to the voluntary nature of such 
an act, it can be assumed that the right to self-determination implies the presumption 
of the continued existence of the state even after its collapse. It seems that such a pre-
sumption is a fundamental consequence of the right to self-determination considered in 
connection with the problems of the state’s collapse. This presumption now serves to rein-
force the general presumption of the continuity of the state that derives from international 
law. The right of every nation to form its own state was formulated as a political postulate. 
According to W.I. Lenin “... through self-determination of nations is understood as their 
state detachment from the national teams, it means the creation of a self-contained na-
tion-state.” Lenin’s concept of the right to self-determination, as opposed to the Western 
(Wilsonian) concept of the right to self-determination, did not include colonial lands, ex-
cluding the provinces of the Ottoman Empire, if they were considered as “colonial areas”14. 
In any case – as L. Dembiński states – “irrespective of various theoretical interpretations of 
the Wilsonian and Leninist concept of the principle of self-determination, their political 
application was almost entirely restricted to the European peoples who had never had, or 
were deprived of, independent existence”15. In the interwar period, the principle of self-de-
termination was the only political principle, but it played a significant role as the only basis 
for shaping the international order. The right to self-determination was elevated to the 
rank of a principle of international law only with the entry into force of the United Nations 
Charter. However, the provisions of the UN Charter are very general in this respect (Ar-
ticles 1 and 55). The development of the principle of self-determination took place in the 
resolutions of the UN General Assembly. Resolution 637 A / VII concerning the right of 
peoples and people for self-determination and the declaration on granting independence 
to colonial countries and peoples (res 1514 / XV) should be mentioned here16. In a broader 
context, the principle of self-determination has been defined in the declaration of the in-
ternational rules regarding friendly relations and the cooperation of states in accordance 
14 W. I. Lenin: O prawie narodów do samostanowienia, in: Dzieła wybrane, Warszawa 1949, t. 1, p. 70. 
15 L. Dembiński: Samostanowienie w prawie i praktyce ONZ, Warszawa 1969, p. 20.
16 At the opposite extreme, however, the right of peoples to self-determination was invoked as the 
basis for the intervention of the organized international community. The UN Charter begins 
with the words, “We, the peoples…” and the right of self-determination, based on the UN 
Charter, has emerged as a fundamental principle of modern international law. In an opinion 
on Namibia, given in 1970 in relation to the illegal presence of South Africa in the territory 
concerned, the International Court of Justice had already declared that “the injured entity is 
a people which must look to the international community for assistance” Legal Consequences 
for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia [South West Africa ] Not-
withstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 56. 
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with the UN Charter (Resolution 2625 / XXV). In a special context, the right to self-
determination is dealt with by the UN General Assembly resolution on the definition of 
aggression (Res. 3314 / XXIX). Naturally, Art. 1 of both UN Covenants on Human Rights 
establishes the right to self-determination for “all peoples”. In UN practice, there is a spe-
cial relationship between the right of peoples to self-determination and decolonization. In 
Resolution 637 / A / VII, the General Assembly recommended that “States member of 
the United Nations recognize and support the implementation of the right to self-rule na-
tions that are under their administration and facilitate the exercise of this right for nations 
in such areas, in accordance with the principles and spirit of the United Nations Charter, 
in each area and in accordance with the free will of the nations concerned.” Resolution 
1514 / XV /, calling for independence for countries and peoples, clearly highlights this 
relationship. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the content of other UN resolutions. 
The connection between the right of peoples to self-determination and decolonization 
was also emphasized in doctrine. L. Dembiński states that from the Second World War 
“the problem of self-management was closely related to the problem of the colony, and so 
much that it was impossible to separate them separately.” A similar opinion is expressed 
by H. Bokor-Szegó when he writes that nowadays a typical form of applying the right to 
self-determination is the separation of a territory dependent on the colonial power and the 
creation of its own non-independent state. International community has recognized that 
people of dependent areas has the right to independence, what it confirmed by the practice 
on the United Nations, its States and the views of scholars.
Secession as a Form of Insurrection and Collapse of the State
Does the right to self-determination also mean the right of orthers than colonial peoples 
to independence? Does the right to self-determination include the so-called right to se-
cession17? This issue is contentious. In addition to the view that “the introduction of self-
determination into international law necessarily entails the recognition of the right to 
secession”, one can find the opinions of authors who deny the existence of such a right or 
at least doubt its existence18. Considering this problem, it must be claimed that existence 
or non-existence can only be inferred from the practice of the post-World War II period. 
Since before that the right to self-determination was only a political and moral prin-
17 G.  Abi-Saab, Conclusion, in: Secession : A  Contemporary International Law Perspective, dir. 
M.  Kohen, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 470; W.  Czapliński, Samostanowienie-seces-
ja-uznanie (uwagi na tle inkorporacja Krymu do Federacji Rosyjskiej, [w:] Państwo i  teryritorium 
w prawie międzynarodowym, eds. J. Menkes, E. Cała-Wacinkiewicz, Warszawa 2015, pp. 245–246.
18 S. Kaur, Self-Determination in International Law, in: “Indian Journal of International Law” 1970, 
vol. 10, p. 493; R.  Emerson, Self-Determination, in: “American Journal of International Law” 
1971, vol. 65, p. 464; M. Shaw, International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003.
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ciple, from the fact that with the independence of some European nations after the First 
World War the right to self-determination was invoked, no conclusions can be drawn 
about the “right to secession”. By secession, we mean the separation of an integral part 
of the state territory. Most countries ceased to treat independence in the colonial areas 
at the time when self-determination became the rule of international law as secession. 
According to the prevailing view, the area is not self-governing is not an integral part of 
the metropolitan territory. The United Nations Declaration in Resolution 2625 / XXV 
states that the territory of a colony or other non-dependent area has, by virtue of the UN 
Charter, a status which is distinct and different from the territory administering it, while 
such separate and different status under the Charter should exist until such time as the 
people of the colony or non-dependent area will exercise their right to self-determina-
tion in accordance with the Charter, in particular with its aims and principles19. For this 
reason – as L. Antonowicz notes – the issue of the independence of colonial territories differs 
from the issue of secession of other types of territories20. In the course of the codification work 
on the secession of states in relation to the treaties, the International Law Commission 
clearly opposed the independence of the colonies in the UN period, the former cases of 
independence by the colonies, and so in the period when they were considered “as being 
in the full sense, the territories of the colonial power.” 
The right of the colonial peoples to independence is, therefore, an issue different from 
the “right to secession”, i.e. on the basis of the right of these peoples to independence, 
one can not infer the right to secession to exist. Based on the current practice of states 
and international organizations (e.g. the negative position of the United Nations and the 
Organization of African Unity with regard to the movements of secession in Katanga 
and Biafra) the thesis can be put forward that international law does not acknowledge 
the right to secession, because – in the light of this practice – it does not stem from the 
principle of self-determination of the state. The principle of international law: the “right 
to secession”, as the right of a specific nation or people inhabiting an integral part of the 
state (and a territorially constituent minority in it) to separate from it and create its own 
state, would be – in the light of understood practice – only a political principle. This is, 
of course, the transformation of the future “right to secession” into a legal principle. The 
above thesis is not the only possible interpretation of the principle of self-determination. 
In any case, it must be emphasized at this point that the statement that international 
law does not acknowledge the “right to secession” cannot lead to the conclusion that it is 
forbidden. In particular, the principle of territorial integrity does not prohibit secession, 
as this applies to relations between states, not relations between a state and a popula-
tion of territories within its territory. But secession violates the principles of territorial 
19 Vid. J. Symonides, op. cit., p. 178–179; W. Multan, J. Symonides, op. cit., pp. 50–51.
20 L.  Antonowicz: Likwidacja kolonializmu ze stanowiska prawa międzynarodowego, Warszawa 
1964, pp. 131–132. 
The Issues of Secession in the Process of the Rise… | 139 
integrity. Due to the fact that UN practice limited the application of the right to self-de-
termination to colonial peoples, the establishment of a state in the former colonial area 
puts them in a situation which in the light of UN law is more advantageous than that of 
the situation of astate resulting from secession. However, the right to self-determination 
itself does not create any state, neither does the state create a legal act of another state 
or states. The state always arises from its own power (chapter III). Therefore, the right to 
self-determination matters only to the genesis of the state.
Conclusion
In the end, it must be emphasized that if international law “does not prohibit” secession, 
this does not mean that it refers back to the state and secessionist group. The right of 
sel – determination remains hostile to secession. Establishing a presumption against the 
effectiveness of secession and in favor of the territorial integrity of the pre-existing State. 
Effectivities thus often have a greater role to play in terms of acquiescence, or rather the 
resignation of the pre-existing State (which, compelled by the force of facts, realizes that 
it no longer really has a choice and abandons its attempts at recovery), than that of the 
“automatic” birth of a new state.
The myth of the “absolute neutrality” of the law, advocated by the theory of effective-
ness, does not, therefore, seem to correspond exactly to reality. Relying on, inter alia, the 
resolutions and declarations of the Security Council concerning secessionist crises in 
Bosnia, Croatia, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan etc., some writers have even wondered 
if some emerging trends indicate a prohibition on secession and the legalization of re-
pression. Perhaps the argument would be stronger if the case of Kosovo did not weaken 
it not so much, which is a real “anomaly” within the system and could constitute a very 
dangerous precedent, as evidenced by the numerous references to the possible indepen-
dence of Kosovo by various independence movements or other actors. 
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summary
The Issues of Secession in the Process of the Rise and Fall 
of States in the Light of International Law 
The aims of this contribution is to check the validity of the old theory, which goes back 
to Jellinek but is still dominant, which states that secession as well as the process of 
forming a new state, fall under the scope of a “simple fact” and thereby escape through 
definition to any law of way. According to this theory, secession is not a question of 
“Law” but a question of pure fact, failure or success: if a secessionist movement succeeds 
in establishing a new effectiveness, that is to say, puts in place the “Constituent elements” 
of a state, a new state is born. It is interesting to observe that with the phenomenon 
of the rise or the collapse of States, from the global perspective of international order 
and especially from the point of view of international law, the States concerned are, in 
practice, not simply left to their fate. On the contrary, the rise or the collapse of a State 
anywhere in the world is seen as a matter of concern for the international community, 
since the international system as a whole is felt to be affected. In such cases, international 
reactions have not been manifested primarily through the States as such, either indi-
vidually or together. Basically, these reactions had to cope with the dilemma of choos-
ing between two fundamental principles of legitimacy in international law: on the one 
hand, the sovereignty and equality of States and, on the other, the right of peoples to 
self-determination. 
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